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Compensation for Victims of Crime
In recent years considerable attention has been directed to a wide va-
riety of programs for assisting victims of misfortune. Late arrivals on
the scene, and curious hybrids as well, are proposals to compensate vic-
tims of crime. Reflecting both the social welfare philosophy which un-
derlies medicare and the search for supplements to private law relief
illustrated by the automobile compensation plans,' the proposals for
victims of crime have occasioned extensive legislative2 and popular in-
terest3 in the few years that have elapsed since the idea was first pro-
posed.4
The novelty of the compensation plans lies less in their content than
in the emergence of a demand that such a program be undertaken.
The sudden fashionability of the idea may be traced in part to the
adoption of schemes in Great Britain 5 and in New Zealand,6 which have
1 For recent contrasting views of proposals to reform the present system of automobile
accident litigation, compare BLUM 8: KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW
PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965), originally printed in 31 U. CHi. L. REv. 641
(1964), with KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUE-
PRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
2 California, the first state to adopt compensation legislation, enacted two laws in 1965.
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 13600-03 (a "Good Samaritan" law); CAL. WELFARE & INST'Ns CODE
§ 11211. Other states in which proposals have been or are expected to be introduced in-
dude Illinois (Chicago Sun-Times, March 30, 1966, p. 35, col. 1); Maryland (S. Bill 151,
Feb. 4, 1966); New Jersey (N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1966, p. 62, col. 1); New York (N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 1965, p. 1, col. 5); Oregon (H. Bill 1822, March 4, 1965); and Wisconsin (S. Bill
450, April 1965). On the local level, New York City enacted an ordinance to assist Good
Samaritans. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 67-3.2 (1965). Several federal bills have also
been introduced: S. 2155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Senator Yarborough) [hereinafter
cited as S. 2155]; H.R. 11818, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Representative Green) [herein-
after cited as H.R. 11818]; H.R. 11552, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Representative Hatha-
way); H.R. 11291, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Representative Matsunaga); H.R. 11211,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Representative Bingham); H.R. 10896, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). The Yarborough bill, of which all the other bills except that proposed by Repre-
sentative Green are replicas, applies only to the District of Columbia and to outlying
territories. The Green proposal would establish a national compensation scheme.
3 The Gallup poll reports that 62 per cent of "a representative group of American
voters" would favor state compensation for the family of an innocent person killed by a
criminal. Gallup Poll, Press Release, Oct. 29, 1965.
4 Compensation was first seriously proposed in England in Fry, Justice for Victims, The
Observer (London), July 7, 1957, p. 8, col. 2, reprinted in Compensation for Victims of
Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 191 (1959).
5 The British scheme, which is nonstatutory, was announced by the government in a
White Paper, Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, CMND. 2523 (1964) [herein-
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been extensively reported in this country.7 In addition, heightened pub-
lic concern over increasing crime rates8 has led to demands for im-
proved law enforcement and for other measures for the protection of
the public,9 while dismay over the unwillingness of citizens to act as
"Good Samaritans" has provoked desire to recompense those who come
to the aid of others.10 The degree of interest which the compensation
proposals have generated is nonetheless remarkable in that until a few
years ago the possibility had received virtually no serious consideration;
perhaps for that reason, much discussion of it has seemed undirected
and superficial. It thus seems appropriate at this time to set out some
of the proposals which have been made, to examine the justifications
advanced for them, and to pose some of the problems with which any
scheme must deal.
I. COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS: ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES
Since individuals are expected to bear the consequences of many
kinds of misfortune, proponents of compensation schemes have been
unable to demonstrate that victims of crime should be compensated
after cited as CMND. 2323]. The adoption of the plan was preceded by the report of a
Government-appointed committee known as the Working Party, also published as a White
Paper, Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, CmND. 1406 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as CMND. 1406]. See also a reply to the Working Party's report by the Justice Society
(British Section of the International Commission of Jurists), COMPENSATION FOR VICrIM
OF CRaMEs oF VIOLENCE 1962 [hereinafter cited as JusricE REPORT].
6 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 1963, No. 134 [hereinafter cited as N.Z. Pub.
Act 134].
7 E.g., Anderson, Should We Pay Crime Victims?, Parade Magazine, Nov. 8, 1964, p. 4;
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), p. 19; N.Y. Times, March 24, 1964, p. 1, col. 7
(comment on British proposal); N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1963, p. 26, col. 1 (New Zealand
scheme); Cameron, Compensation for Victims of Crime: The New Zealand Experiment,
12 J. PUB. L. 367 (1963); Note, Great Britain Approves Compensation Program for Victims
of Criminal Violence, 78 HAuv. L. Rnv. 1683 (1965).
8 According to the FBI, the number of "serious offenses" (murder and non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, larceny over $50 and
auto theft) increased 11% from 1963 to 1964. The rate of violent crime (including robbery),
taking into account population growth, increased 27% from 1958; the comparable figure
for property offenses was 46%. FBI, UNIFORM CIum REPoRTs-1964, at 2-5. The reliability
of the FBI statistics has, however, been seriously questioned. See BELL, Tm END OF
IDEOLOGY 137-44 (1960).
9 E.g., President Johnson's declaration of "War on Crime." Establishing the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Exec. Order No. 11236,
30 Fed. Reg. 9349 (1965).
10 See General Remarks by Norval Morris, Professor of Law and Criminology, The
University of Chicago Law School, commenting on the morning session of the Conference
on "the Good Samaritan and the Bad," Friday, April 9, 1965, at the Law School of The
University of Chicago (mimeo). This and other papers from the Conference will be pub-
lished by Doubleday in September, 1966.
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simply by observing that they need assistance. Instead, the various pro-
posals for shifting losses from victims of crime have relied on three
principal arguments, which have been used to support one another"1
but may be stated in the alternative: (1) that the offender has an obliga-
tion to make restitution to the victim, and the state an obligation either
to expedite such relief or to offer a substitute; (2) that the state is liable
because it has failed to fulfill its duty to protect its citizens; and (3) that
the state should assume a general social responsibility to aid unfor-
tunates when, as here, such aid would serve compelling social policies.
A. Restitution
Tort and criminal law derived from the same stem and restitution
was once awarded to victims as an incident of criminal prosecution.12
Nevertheless the two actions gradually became distinct and today, apart
from occasional statutes which permit courts to order offenders con-
victed of certain crimes to make payments to their victims in lieu of
punishment or as a condition of probation, 3 it is the general rule that
the victim may not be a party to criminal proceedings but must seek
relief in a separate civil action.' 4 The victim's private remedy is of little
11 See, e.g., Fry, supra note 4.
12 The offender and his family were obligated to make payments to the victim and his
family; at the same time, the offender might also be required to make a payment to the
king or lord. See 2 PoL.oca & MAITLAND, HisToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 449-62 (2d ed. 1898);
Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN. L. Rlv. 223,
227-28 (1965).
13 Under federal law, a court may require an offender to make restitution as a con-
dition of probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3651. For discussion of various state statutes see Covey,
Alternatives to a Compensation Plan for Victims of Physical Violence, 69 Dfix. L. R.v.
391, 400 (1965); Note, Restitution and the Criminal Law, 39 CoLuM. L. R.v. 1185, 1190-97
(1939). Restitution orders are used infrequently, however. See Schultz, The Violated: A
Proposal To Compensate Victims of Violent Crime, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 238, 243-44 (1965).
14 The actions may be brought in any order and the decision in one does not affect
the other. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 2, 7-9 (Sd ed. 1964); Hitchler, Crimes and Civil Injuries, 39
DIcK. L. RF.v. 23, 32 (1934). The rule in most jurisdictions that evidence of a criminal
conviction is not admissible in a subsequent civil action has been under attack, however,
and may be breaking down. See Bush, Criminal Convictions as Evidence in Civil Proceed-
ings, 29 Miss. L. REv. 276 (1958); Note, Admissibility and Conclusiveness of Criminal Con-
viction in Subsequent Civil Action, 16 MERGER L. Rnv. 464 (1965) (commenting on Hurtt
v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965) (evidence of defendant's prior conviction
for extortion held conclusive of the fact of extortion in a later civil action by the
victim to recover the money)); Note, Use of Record of Criminal Conviction in Subsequent
Civil Action Arising From the Same Facts as the Prosecution, 64 Micir. L. REv. 702 (1966).
Support for the view that evidence of conviction should be admissible may be found in
MCCORMiCK, EvmaucE § 295 (1954); WiGMoRE, EvmENcE § 1671(a) (3d ed. 1940); UNIFORM
RuLE oF EviDENcF 63(20) (1953).
The rule that the victim must prove his case in an independent civil action is not
followed in many European countries; there the awarding of restitution in criminal
1966]
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utility in practice,15 however, as criminals are not always apprehended
and, when found, are likely to be financially irresponsible, 6 particularly
as they cannot like other tort-feasors protect themselves in advance by
means of liability insurance. 7 The prospects for a successful civil action
are further diminished by criminal prosecution, which not only subjects
the offender to the costs of his defense but, more significantly, to penal
sanctions of imprisonment and fines. The inefficacy of the civil rem-
edy, in part a consequence of the strong public interest in punishing
criminal conduct,'8 has led some commentators to urge that the his-
torical cycle be completed by state intervention to enforce the victim's
claim for restitution. 9
Attempts to revive restitution in the context of the present penal
system suggest that the idea has fundamental shortcomings. California
recently enacted legislation which provides public welfare assistance to
victims incapacitated by crimes of violence through the imposition of
fines on offenders convicted of such crimes in addition to other penal
sanctions imposed. 20 As the law does not resolve the difficulty posed by
proceedings is relatively common, and in some instances the victim may be a party in a
criminal trial. See generally SCHAFR, REsTITUTION TO VICnIs (1960) (comparative law study
of provisions for restitution in different legal systems); Silving, Comment on the Proposal,
Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 236 (1959).
Suggestions that, in light of that experience, joinder of civil and criminal actions or ex-
tension of the sentencing court's power to order restitution be allowed as suitable alter-
natives to compensation raise several difficulties, however. See Covey, supra note 13, at
402-04.
15 See, e.g., Mueller, Comment on the Proposal, Compensation for Victims of Criminal
Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 218, 234 (1959).
16 Cf. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JusncE, REPORT (1963) (finding that a significant number of accused are unable
to afford legal representation, to make bail, or to finance an appeal).
17 Insurance against criminal liability is proscribed both on grounds of public policy
and by the insurance principle that only those risks are insurable which are not subject
to the control of the parties to the contract. VANCE, INSUaNuCE 90-91 (3d ed. 1951). The
rule is not applied to minor traffic violations or to offenses which are mala prohibita
rather than mala in se. See McNeeley, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41
COLum. L. REV. 26 (1941).
18 The coincidence of criminal and civil actions may also limit the victim's freedom
to effect a private settlement with the offender. While the law in other areas encourages
private settlement, the victim of crime who accepts restitution in return for an agreement
to remain silent himself commits the offense of compounding a felony. There is nothing
to prevent the victim who has already reported a crime to the police from demanding
settlement; it has been suggested, however, that settlement of the extra legal variety is far
more common. Note, supra note 13, 39 COLUm. L. RiEv. at 1186, 1190-92.
19 See, e.g., Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Mod-
ernized, 50 MINN. L. REv. 243 (1965).
20 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 11211.
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the financial irresponsibility of criminals as a class,21 it seems unlikely
that the fines collected will provide more than token aid for victims. 22
More ambitious schemes for restitution have been advocated from time
to time by penologists who suggest extensive prison reform by which
prison earnings might be increased and applied to the needs of victims
or a period of probation after sentence is served during which money
might be earned to pay victims. 23 Perhaps because these schemes are so
unlikely of adoption, the merits of reparation as a means of rehabilitat-
ing the offender have received little discussion; 24 it is possible, how-
ever, that the incentives for prisoners to learn new skills and for pa-
rolees to seek jobs would be weakened by the diversion of their
earnings to victims unless a carefully administered plan comparable
to chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act were established. 25
The British government's conclusion that a compensation plan based
21 In recognition that the hardships resulting from imposition of fines on impoverished
offenders would be borne by their families or eventually by the state, the law exempts
from the payment of fines those criminals whose families would become welfare charges
if a fine were levied. Ibid.
22 Eligibility for payments will be determined by criteria substantially similar to those
for aid to dependent children, and benefits will be paid on that scale. The total amount
payable under the program in its first year is limited to $100,000. Ibid. See Note, California
Enacts Legislation To Aid Victims of Violence, 18 STAN. L. REV. 266, 268-73 (1965).
23 The penologists' proposals for restitution stem from a concept of reparation as a
technique of rehabilitation. A British White Paper on penal policy suggested: "It may
well be that our penal system would not only provide a more effective deterrent to crime,
but would also find a greater moral value, if the concept of personal reparation to the
victim were added to the concepts of deterrence by punishment and of reform by training."
Penal Practice in a Changing Society, CMND. 645, at 7 (1959). See also Eglash, Creative
Restitution: A Broader Meaning for an Old Term, 48 J. Cmat. L., C. & P.S. 619 (1958);
Schafer, supra note 19, at 251-53. Restitution has a long history in penal thought. See
Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 444,
448-55 (1964); Silving, supra note 14, at 239-46.
24 Professor Wolfgang has observed, however, that the value of reparation as an instru-
ment of rehabilitation would be greatest in cases of first offenders or juvenile delinquents
who share to some extent the values of the culture which they have offended; the pro-
fessional criminal or the psychopath might be less amenable to the influence of reparation.
Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence: Interdisciplinary Prob-
lems in Criminology, in PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY 1964, at 169,
173-74.
25 Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964), allows a wage earner,
with the consent of court and creditors, to pay his debts out of future earnings while
protected from garnishments and wage attachments. A court-appointed trustee receives
the debtor's salary checks as they are earned, distributing a portion, usually around twenty
per cent, to creditors. A chapter XIII plan is intended to save the debtor from the stigma
of formal bankruptcy; much of its success depends on his sincere desire to meet his
obligations and on the counselling made available to him. See generally Riley, Chapter
XIIIs in the Madison Bankruptcy Court, 37 J. NAT' Ass'N OF REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY
55 (1963); Note, Wage Earners' Plans-Chapter XIII, 45 MARQUETTE L. REv. 582 (1962).
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on restitution was impracticable absent major penal reform 6 seems
applicable to this country. Although it may be sensible to exact from
prosperous criminals whatever restitution they can supply,27 it is clear
that restitution will fall short of providing adequate compensation for
victims. State compensation thus seems necessary if that objective is
to be accomplished, and it may be argued that the state, because it
impairs the victim's private remedy to a certain extent by interposing
criminal sanctions, may have some obligation to provide an alternative
source of assistance.
B. Liability of the State
In describing the victim of crime as one "denied the protection of
the laws," 28 Mr. Justice Goldberg has expressed the view of some recent
commentators29 that because the state has a duty to protect its citizens
it has a corresponding obligation to assist them when that duty is not
fulfilled. An early protagonist of this view was Jeremy Bentham who,
taking exception to the traditional understanding that law enforcement,
like criminal prosecution, is properly unconcerned with the individual
interests of victims,80 argued instead that enforcement of the criminal
law is a guarantee of the security of the individual as well as of the
community.31 Stressing that the state undertakes to maintain conditions
26 The Working Party, although concluding that a scheme based solely on restitution
was unfeasible, nevertheless thought some provision for recovery from the offender
desirable. CMND. 1406, at 5. When the Government announced its compensation plan,
however, it declared that restitution was impracticable in a majority of cases. CMND.
2323, at 7. The scheme's administrators have reached the same conclusion. Criminal In-
juries Compensation Board: First Report and Accounts, CMND. 2782, at 6 (1965).
27 The British plan does not disturb the existing framework of tort liability, although
the victim who recovers a civil judgment must repay the state up to the amount pre-
viously received in compensation. CMND. 2323, at 7. Under the New Zealand law, the state
may recover from the offender if payments can be made without detriment to his family
or his own rehabilitation. N.Z. Pub. Act 134 § 23. One federal proposal authorizes the
compensation authority to bring a civil action against the offender to recover up to the
amount of compensation paid. S. 2155 § 401. See generally Rothstein, State Compensation
for Criminally Inflicted Injuries, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 38, 47-48 (1965).
28 "The victim of a robbery or an assault has been denied the 'protection' of the laws
in a very real sense, and society should assume some responsibility for making him whole."
Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 205, 224 (1964).
29 See, e.g., Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 455. Fry, supra note 4, at 193.
30 E.g., Mueller's argument that crime prevention is the historical goal of the criminal
law and that improved law enforcement, rather than compensation, is the proper form
of intervention on behalf of victims. Mueller, supra note 15, at 221-29. He fears that com-
pensation would lessen public interest in efficient law enforcement. Id. at 231. Similar
fears have been expressed by Bruen, Controlling Violence v. Compensating Victims, 50
A.B.A.J. 855 (1964); Inbau, Comment on the Proposal, Compensation for Victims of
Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 201, 202-03 (1959).
31 BENTHAM, THEORY oF LEGISLATION 317-18 (1864).
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of public safety and encourages citizens to rely on it for protection,32
Bentham suggested that the costs of failures of police protection as well
as the costs of providing it should be borne by the state and thus ulti-
mately shared by the community as a whole.33
Despite early espousal by Bentham, the notion that the state has an
obligation to insulate its citizens from the consequences of crime has
failed to win legal acceptance. Its rejection may stem in part from a
general reluctance to impose liability on any agency for the wrongful
acts of others, 4 and perhaps also from doubts that the state does in fact
undertake to provide more than a general condition of public order.3 5
Many crimes are not within the state's power to prevent, as they are
committed in places where the police have no right to be 6 or by
persons whom they have no ground to suspect. If the rejection of state
liability also reflects a desire to protect public funds from depletion,
recent legislation3r indicates that despite erosion of sovereign immunity
32 "Has a crime been committed? Those who have suffered by it, either in their person
or in their fortune, are left to their evil condition. The society which they have contributed
to maintain, and which ought to protect them, owes them, however, an indemnity, when
its protection has not been effectual." 1 WoRKS OF JEREMY BEma-TH 589 (Limited ed.
1962), cited in Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. at 446.
33 To a considerable degree Bentham's discussion anticipates modem theories of risk
spreading and enterprise liability. See BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, 317-30 (1864).
34 In a related context, however, absolute liability has been imposed for reasons of
public policy. Many states have statutes which permit a person whose property, and in
some states person as well, is injured by rioters to recover damages from the town or
county where the riot occurred. The Illinois Mob Violence Act, now ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 24,
§ 1-4-8 (Supp. 1965), was held a constitutional exercise of the state's police power by the
Supreme Court on the theory that the state which creates municipal corporations delegates
to them the responsibility of maintaining public order and may enforce that obligation
by imposing sanctions on the community which participates or tolerates mob disorder.
City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 323 (1911); cf. Note, Municipal Tort Liability:
Statutory Liability of Municipalities for Damage Caused by Mobs and Riots, 50 CoRuaL
L.Q. 699 (1965). See also Slaton v. City of Chicago, 8 Ill. App. 2d 47, 58 (1955); Note,
Communal Liability for Mob Violence, 49 HAIv. L. REv. 1362 (1936).
35 This objection was expressed by the British Working Party: "[T]here is a distinction
between compensation for the consequences of civil riot, which the forces of law and order
may be expected -to prevent, and compensation for individual acts of personal violence,
which can never be entirely prevented .... [1]t does not follow that the State has assumed
the duty of protecting [its citizens] .. . everywhere. . . . Ihe most it has done is to
create an assumption that it will provide a general condition of civil peace." CMND. 1406,
at 7.
36 Nearly one-third of all criminal homicides occur among family members in the
home. FBI, UNIFoRM CRIME Rarsomrs-1964, at 7. See also note 90 infra and accompanying
text.
37 See, e.g., Illinois' recently enacted municipal tort liability legislation which contains a
deliberate effort to forestall the development of liability for failure of police protection:
"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a
police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection
is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent
1966]
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in other areas there is to be no accompanying recognition of liability
for failures of police protection."3 Nor do expressions of legislative 3
and judicial concern 40 for the Good Samaritan constitute acceptance of
a state liability to victims of crime: 41 because the Good Samaritan's
claim, unlike that of most victims, is derived from the performance of
a public service, the obligation of the public to indemnify him has
peculiar overtones of reciprocity and is further buttressed by a public
interest in encouraging similar conduct on the part of others.42
the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend criminals." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85,
§ 4-102 (Supp. 1965). In California the enactment of tort liability legislation was accom-
panied by repeal of the state's long-standing mob violence law. Cal. Stats., ch. 1681,
§ 18 (1963), repealing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50140-45.
38 The trend toward imposition of liability for negligent performance of proprietary func-
tions has not been accompanied by liability for negligence in performing governmental
functions such as police protection. Covey, supra note 13, at 393-94; James, Tort Liability
of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610, 622-29 (1955).
39 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13600-03; NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 67-3.2 (1965). These
statutes supplement a long-recognized statutory duty to indemnify a person injured while
responding to a policeman's request for assistance. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-8 (1964)
(misdemeanor to fail unreasonably to come to the aid of a peace officer when requested by
him tQ do so); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-6 (1964) (provision for indemnity).
40 In the leading case, Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958),
the survivor of a murdered police informer brought an action for wrongful death against
New York City, alleging that the police had taken inadequate measures to safeguard the
decedent. The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action on the ground that
"the public (acting in this instance through the City of New York) owes a special duty
to use reasonable care for the protection of persons who have collaborated with it in the
arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger due
to their collaboration." Id. at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537. Commentators were in agreement
that -the special duty rationale of the Schuster case, while it appeared a radical extension
of state liability, was in fact a narrow one limited to the particular fact situation of the
case. See 59 COLUm. L. REv. 487 (1959); 72 HARV. L. R~v. 1386 (1959); 57 Micu. L. REv.
917 (1959).
41 The California and New York City Good Samaritan laws cited note 39 supra fall
short of a recognition of state liability. Under the New York City law, the applicant is
permitted to apply to the city Board of Estimate for an award; the statute expressly
provides, however, that awards are ex gratia and within the discretion of the Board.
NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 67-3.2 (1965). Under the California law, the Good Samari-
tan must seek an award from the state Board of Control, which is to hold a hearing on
the claim and the recommendations of law enforcement agencies. If satisfied that the
claim is valid the Board must then recommend to the legislature that an appropriation
be made to indemnify the claimant. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13600-03. It has been suggested
that this law does not impose liability on the state but merely institutionalizes a procedure
for bringing a bill for private relief. Note, supra note 22, 18 STAN. L. REv. at 267-68.
42 As to the treatment of the Good Samaritan in a scheme which covers victims gener-
ally, see JusricE REPORT 11-12, suggesting such persons be compensated for any injuries
sustained in an attempt to apprehend a criminal. The British plan adopted this approach.
CMND. 2323, at 5. The other plans, however, do not distinguish the Good Samaritan from
other victims and would presumably compensate him only for injuries inflicted by the
criminal.
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The possibility of compensation based on the duty to protect prin-
ciple is not foreclosed since the scope of state liability could be ex-
panded by statute. Not only does that possibility appear remote, how-
ever, but such a theory has overly broad implications. Perhaps aware
that liability predicated on a failure to exercise the myriad regulatory
and protective functions of today's government would be so broad as
to require a fundamental reconsideration of the role of the government
in their performance, most proponents of compensation have preferred
to regard the duty to protect as an argument for social legislation on
behalf of the victim rather than as a basis of legal liability.
43
C. Social Welfare
Much support for compensation has come from those who regard
it, like unemployment insurance or old-age benefits, as an aspect of a
general social responsibility to alleviate certain kinds of misfortune.44
Public intervention on behalf of the victim of crime is appropriate, it
is argued, both because distribution of the costs of crime among mem-
bers of the community as a whole is preferable as a matter of social
efficiency to the present system of relying upon private initiatives to
move the loss, 45 and because a rudimentary sense of justice requires
that compensation be provided. 46
It has been argued that, apart from considerations of fairness, com-
pensation would be the best way to distribute the costs of crime because
it would spread a risk to which each member of the community is ex-
posed throughout the entire group, thereby ensuring each individual
protection against unexpected misfortune at a very small cost to him.47
Compensation financed from general tax revenues involves more than
simple risk spreading, however: because crime rates vary substantially
among racial, cultural, and economic groups,48 it is apparent that every
citizen does not run an equal risk of becoming a victim of violence and
that compensation would inevitably redistribute the costs of crime
from some groups which at present bear a heavy portion of those costs
to others on which they fall more lightly. Professor Childres' sugges-
43 See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. at 457; Fry, supra note 4, at
191-94; Yarborough, S. 2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress-the Criminal Injuries Compen-
sation Act, 50 MINN L. Ray. 255 (1965).
45 See notes 47-52 infra and accompanying text.
46 See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
47 Fry, supra note 4, at 192-93.
48 Lower class Negroes, for example, are more likely to be victims of violence than are
middle class whites. According to the FBI, more than half the persons murdered in 1964
were Negro, as were more than half the persons arrested for murder. FBI, UNIFORM
CImE RPoRs--1964, at 7.
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tion that compensation is necessary because many victims cannot afford
private insurance49 implies a similar redistribution. Although little
evidence has been adduced as to the extent to which victims of crime
do in fact rely on private insurance to absorb their losses,50 even an
opponent of compensation concedes such defects in private insurance
as high premiums, low benefits for disability, and policy exceptions
which sometimes deny benefits to victims of crime.51 If, as seems likely,
adequate low cost private insurance is unavailable to many persons,
particularly to those who are most likely to be victims of crime, social
insurance may be an appropriate method of financing protection in
accordance with the ability to pay and thus of subsidizing the poor
victim.52
The basis of any redistribution scheme, and probably of all compen-
sation plans, is a charitable impulse to assist those who suffer misfor-
tune. Recognition of the needs of the victim of crime is not unfair to
victims of other kinds of misfortune as it does not detract from their
claims for assistance; in one view, indeed, the extent to which other
groups are provided for makes the case for the victim of crime more
compelling. 53 Nonetheless, the fairness of compensating victims of crime
must be measured against the fairness of imposing their losses on
others. While the burgeoning of social legislation in other areas has
deprived the traditional argument that one not at fault should not be
required to insure others against their misfortunes, 54 of much of its
49 Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. at 457.
50 But see Starrs, A Modest Proposal To Insure Justice for Victims of Crime, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 285, 291-94 (1965). The number of individuals who carry some form of life, medical,
disability, or other personal insurance is, as he observes, very large; he offers no estimate,
however, as to the number of persons who presently receive medical care at public ex-
pense. Starts himself questions the adequacy of private insurance benefits. Id. at 301-09.
See also Mueller, supra note 15, at 236.
51 Starrs, supra note 50, at 301-09. His assumption that insurance companies could afford
to substantially increase benefits while at the same time lowering premiums is unsubstan-
tiated.
52 In a federal program financed from general taxation, the progressive structure of
the income tax would operate in theory to shift the costs of premiums more heavily onto
wealthier taxpayers. Cf. BLUm & KALVEN, PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW
PROBLEM: AuTo COMPENSATION PLANS 83 (1965). To the extent that the tax structure were
regressive, however, as state systems based on property and sales taxes are generally con-
ceded to be, the redistributive effect would be nullified. In a compensation plan financed
on a contributory basis, each taxpayer making an equal contribution, no redistributive
effect would occur except that which would result from forcing low-risk contributors to
pay a premium equal to that paid by high-risk contributors. The possibility is of little
practical significance, however, as the schemes are too small in scale to merit the adminis-
trative costs of collecting a separate tax.
53 See, e.g., Yarborough, supra note 44, at 257. Contra, Inbau, supra note 30, at 203.
54 E.g., Miller's view that the assumption of public responsibility for victims of crime
cannot be justified because the public as a whole is not to blame for the victim's losses
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force, the "atomizing of the liability question into insurance premiums
should not be permitted to cause the liability issue to evaporate." 55
Proponents of compensation have asserted that the society as a whole
has a particular obligation to the victim of crime because it has failed
to protect him from criminal injury and, in addition, has impaired his
potential civil remedy against the offender;55 in addition, it has been
asserted that society by tolerating the conditions which cause crime
incurs some responsibility for its consequences. 57 These arguments, gen-
erally deemed insufficient bases for imposing legal liability on the state,
have instead been relied upon to justify an expression of public sym-
pathy for the victim of crime58 and are thus incorporated into the case
for social legislation on his behalf.
A social welfare approach which regards compensation as an act of
charity justified by a sense of obligation toward the victim has been
accepted as the foundation of most of the plans which have been en-
acted or proposed.5 9 That approach seems a satisfactory one; more
dubious, however, is the tendency of the plans to depart from the "pay-
ment as a matter of right" philosophy of social insurance and to provide
compensation as a public bounty or gratuity.60 Thus, the British decla-
and is not a group so related to the primary wrongdoers as to justify the imposition of
liability. Miller, Comment on the Proposal, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence:
A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 203, 205-09 (1959). He distinguishes compensation from
public welfare programs, however, on the ground that the latter function on the basis of
need regardless of fault and are of a minimal or subsistence nature, whereas compensation
is redress for a wrongful act. Id. at 207.
55 BLUM & KALVEN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 22.
56 See CMND. 1406, at 7-8; Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv, at 455; Fry, Justice
for Victims, The Observer (London), July 7, 1957, p. 8, col. 2, reprinted in Compensation
for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 191, 193 (1959); Yarborough,
supra note 44, at 256.
57 E.g., Silving, Comment on the Proposal, Compensation for Victims of Criminal
Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 236, 252 (1959). It is perhaps unnecessary to place
the blame for the victim's losses entirely on society, as a lesser degree of accountability
might suffice to justify acceptance of some responsibility. See Childres, supra note 23, 39
NoY.U.L. Rrv. at 456-57.
58 See authorities cited note 56 supra.
59 The British Government in announcing the compensation plan stated that: "Com-
pensation will be paid ex gratia. The Government do not accept that the state is liable
for injuries caused to people by the acts of others. The public does, however, feel a sense
of responsibility for and sympathy with the innocent victim, and it is right that this
feeling should find practical expression in the provision of compensation on behalf of the
community." CMND. 2323, at 4. Similar views were entertained in New Zealand. Cameron,
Compensation for Victims of Crime: The New Zealand Experiment, 12 J. PuB. L. 367,
369-70 (1963). Senator Yarborough also accepts the social welfare rationale as the basis of
his plan. Yarborough, supra note 44, at 256.
60 Public payments were generally considered gratuities in the early stages of state
welfare legislation. See Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance, 6 J. PUB. L. 100
(1957); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
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ration that compensation would be paid "ex gratia"61 is reflected in the
New Zealand law and in the federal proposals which also make the
payment of compensation discretionary with administrative authorities
and foreclose judicial review.62 Arguably, if compensation is in fact a
gesture of public sympathy there should be no objection to awarding
it on a discretionary basis, particularly when the discretionary frame-
work offers advantages of flexibility and freedom to experiment.6 3 The
absence of an obligation to undertake such a scheme should not, how-
ever, be confused with absence of a legal right to receive benefits when
one has been granted by the legislature to eligible claimants.64 Inas-
L.J. 1245 (1965). "Payment as a matter of right" became a central principle of social
legislation during the 1930's in an effort to depart from the traditional idea that public
payments were a form of charity. See, e.g., Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation,
63 H~Av. L. Rlv. 266, 268 (1949); tenBroek & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance
-A Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 237, 238-44 (1954); Note, Charity Versus
Social Insurance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 7a YALE L.J. 357, 359 (1963).
The Social Security laws, for example, provide for a complex system of administrative
appeals and for judicial review of findings by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. See Vasconcelles, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Social Security, 50
ILL. B.J. 540, 543-47 (1962).
Veteran's benefits and the Federal Employees Compensation Act, on the other hand,
expressly preclude judicial review; their constitutionality has been upheld on the theory
that such payments are "mere gratuities" to which no legal right attaches and which
Congress may make available as it chooses. See, e.g., Calderon v. Tobin, 187 F.2d 514
(D.C. Cir. 1951) (F.E.C.A.); Van Home v. Hines, 122 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (veteran's
benefits).
61 CMND. 2323, at 4; see note 59 supra. Adoption of the ex gratia approach was in part
an aspect of the Government's decision to begin the scheme on a nonstatutory basis, in
the hope that a period of experimentation would be followed by legislation. See Note,
Great Britain Approves Compensation Program for Victims of Violence, 78 HA v. L. REv.
1683, 1686 (1965). The Board has taken the view, however, that compensation should be
paid to all claimants who fall within the scheme. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,
First Report and Accounts, CMND. 2782, at 4 (1965).
62 E.g., H.R. 11818, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a) (1965) ("In any case in which a person
is injured or killed by any act ... the Commission may, in its discretion .... order the
payment of compensation .. "); H.R. 11818, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207 (1965) (providing
that the agency's decisions are to be final). The bills appear to have been drafted to
satisfy the conditions of unreviewability under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
which provides: "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
Statutes which, like the proposals, merely provide for finality are 'seldom held to manifest
a clear intent to exclude review altogether, Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 11, 71
HARv. L. Rlv. 769, 770 (1958), but where the agency's action is expressly committed to
agency discretion, review may be precluded for that reason. Id. at 774-78; 4 DAvis, Au-
MINiSTRATI LAw TREATSE § 28.16 (1958). Thus, although denial of an award would not
be reviewable on substantive grounds, procedural matters not expressly committed to the
commission's discretion might be.
63 These advantages were thought important in Britain, CMND. 2323, at 4, and in New
Zealand, Cameron, supra note 59, at 372-73.
64 See Rothstein, State Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Injuries, 44 TEXAs L.
REv. 38, 49 (1965).
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much as charitable motives also underlie much of the social legis-
lation of the present day, the notion that public payments for victims
of crime are a gratuity seems oddly anachronistic.
II. THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF COMPENSATION
The social welfare principles underlying most compensation plans
permit substantial flexibility in determining their scope and extent.
Before a program can be enacted, the criminal acts for which compen-
sation is to be awarded and the victims who will qualify for assistance
must be enumerated, and the amount of damages payable for different
categories of injury must be determined. Despite the considerable simi-
larities among the plans,05 solutions to these problems have not yet
evolved, and there remain a number of areas in which significant
variations may be found.
A. What Crimes Should Be Compensated?
Recent interest in compensation has focused on the victim who
suffers personal injury as a result of a crime of violence. 6 If social
welfare reasoning is chosen to support compensation, 67 there seems to
be no compelling reason for not giving effect to what appears to be
a widely held feeling of special concern for physical injury. Com-
mentators have justified the exclusion of crimes against property from
the schemes on the ground that victims who suffer physical injury are
in greater need of assistance both because injury to the person may be
a catastrophe of greater magnitude to the individual than loss of prop-
65 The similarity is in part a measure of the influence of the British and New Zealand
plans, after the latter of which the bill introduced by Senator Yarborough is modeled.
Yarborough, supra note 44, at 258.
66 For a rare exception, see the suggestion of a plan including property damage in
testimony of Dr. Seward Reese, Dean of the College of Law, Willamette University,
before the Senate Judiciary Committee of the Oregon Legislature, March 25, 1965. For
the usual view, see, e.g., Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 460.
67 Since a state's duty to protect its citizens would extend to their property as well as
their persons, the distinction seems difficult to justify under a state liability argument;
indeed, the British Working Party termed the duty to protect principle "dangerous,
because acceptance of public liability for offenses against the person could be the basis
for a demand for acceptance of liability for all offenses against property." CNIND. 1406, at 7.
Because the offender's existing obligation to make restitution is not limited to personal
injuries the exclusion of property loss in a plan based on that principle seems arbitrary;
it might be argued, however, that when the state intervenes to collect restitution it may
limit its assistance to those who are most in need. Thus California's compensation law
provides for the levying of fines on offenders convicted of crimes of violence and for
payments to victims of violence, but not on offenders convicted of other crimes or to
victims who suffer other kinds of loss. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 11211.
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erty68 and because private insurance against loss of property is wide-
spread.69 Moreover, a scheme which included damage to property would
be far more complex and costly than one limited to personal injuries.7 0
Of crimes which may result in personal injury, the plans have with-
out exception excluded regulatory and negligent offenses3 1 Little justi-
fication has been offered for this exclusion beyond an assertion that
such crimes are not violent,72 although it may also be suggested that
in areas where civil recovery is more readily available there is less
need for compensation. There has been some confusion, however,
as to whether injuries resulting from all crimes which require criminal
intent should be compensated, or only those which result from crimes
which are classified as violent. The British scheme requires that injury
be attributable to a criminal offense involving the use of force,73 while
the New Zealand law includes a schedule enumerating solely violent
offenses against the person;7 4 one federal proposal, however, adopts
a broader view, making compensation payable for injury resulting from
any offense which is a felony under state or federal law.7 5 One writer
who favors such a formulation has observed that, while the problem
would arise infrequently, distinctions between violent and non-violent
68 See, e.g., JUSTICE REPORT 7; Childres, supra note 23, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 460; Yarborough,
supra note 44, at 261.
69 See authorities cited note 68 supra. Although not all owners of property can afford
to insure it, it has been asserted that the present system of property insurance is adequate
whatever the deficiencies of insurance against personal injuriest Starrs, supra note 50, at
294-96. The danger that awarding compensation for property damage would encourage
fraudulent claims has also troubled commentators. Miss Fry suggested that while few peo-
ple would wound themselves to obtain a modest compensation, the expense of fraudulent
property claims would be so great as to make compensation for property loss financially
prohibitive. Fry, supra note 56, at 192-93. Miss Fry's point has merit in that the state,
unlike private insurers, would be unable to meet the costs of fraudulent claims by passing
them on to insureds through higher premiums.
70 The number of claims arising from crime against the person would be small in com-
parison with those for loss of property. In 1964 the property offenses of burglary, robbery,
larceny over $50, and auto theft made up 87% of the "serious offenses" indexed by the
FBI. FBI, UNIFORM CRIMm REPoRTs-1964, at 6.
71 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, Schedule; S. 2155, § 302; H.R. 11818, § 302; CMIND. 2323, at 5.
72 CMND. 2323, at 6; Yarborough, supra note 44, at 264.
73 CMND. 2323. at 5.
74 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, Schedule. Such a schedule, which may be a convenient method
of defining the scope of a scheme, has been criticized on the ground that it is impossible to
foresee all the kinds of crimes from which injury may result. See Rothstein, supra note 64,
at 40-41.
75 H.R. 11818, § 302. Although the Yarborough bill follows the New Zealand law in
setting up a schedule of compensable crimes, there apparently is no intent to confine
compensation to crimes of violence. "[W]e presume that any type of crime producing a
personal injury is included as an assault, and that classification would entitle the victim
to an award." Yarborough, supra note 44, at 263.
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crimes are not always easy to draw and are somewhat arbitrary for the
purposes of a social welfare program whose primary concern is injury
to the victim.7 6
If it is thought necessary to confine the scope of compensation more
narrowly, 77 limitations might be imposed in terms of the degree of
injury sustained rather than its source. The British plan and one federal
proposal accomplish this purpose by specifying that injury in order to
be compensable must be sufficiently serious to merit an award in excess
of a certain amount.78 Assuming that the threshold amount were set
at a low level, such a requirement would entail minimum hardship to
victims and might result in substantial savings in the costs of investi-
gating and paying large numbers of small claims.
The scheme might be further narrowed by excluding some specific
offenses, particularly such non-violent sexual offenses as indecent ex-
posure and obscene conduct, which do not usually give rise to physical,
by contrast with mental, injury.79 A further consideration justifying
their exclusion is that, like other sexual offenses, they present special
administrative problems; the commission of such crimes and the degree
of the victim's complicity are difficult to prove, and damages hard to
measure.80 While public opinion in Britain demanded that compen-
sation be provided for some sexual offenses,8 ' and might do so in this
country as well, the inclusion of only forcible sexual offenses might
help to contain these difficulties.82
The awarding of compensation should not necessarily be contingent
on a judicial finding that an act was illegal within the meaning of the
criminal law. The British, New Zealand, and federal plans properly
allow a victim to receive compensation whether or not the offender
76 Rothstein, supra note 64, at 40-41.
77 See, e.g., Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Iniusy, 89 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 444, 459-61 (1964).
78 The Green bill requires that damages exceed $300. H.R. 11818, § 304(b). Under the
British plan, compensation is awarded only for injuries for which" an award of over three
weeks loss of earnings or £50 would be paid. CMND. 2328, at 5.
70 These offenses were included in S. 2155, § 802(7), (8) for the following reason: "If, for
example, such acts produced extreme mental and nervous shock in an elderly lady of
tender sensibilities, the commission should be authorized to exercise its compassionate
discretion." Yarborough, supra note 44, at 218.
80 See JusnrcE REPORT 7-8, 10; Weihofen, Comment on the Proposal, Compensation for
Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 209, 210-11 (1959).
81 CMND. 2823, at 6.
82 See JusTIcE REPORT 7-8, 10. See also Letter From Professor Norval Morris to Senator
Ralph W. Yarborough, Aug. 21, 1965, copy on file at The University of Chicago Law
Review office, discussing the particular problems raised by sexual offenses and suggesting
that it may be "wiser at this stage . . . to exclude those offenses unless there is other
grave physical harm caused by their commission."
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has been apprehended, convicted, or even acquitted.83 The offender's
lack of capacity to form criminal intent for such reasons as insanity,
drunkenness, or infancy is also irrelevant as to whether a compensable
offense was perpetrated on the victim, since these special defenses rep-
resent merely a social judgment that an act which would otherwise be
criminal should be excused.8 4 More difficult questions arise as to the
standard of causation which should be applied to determine whether
the victim's injury was "a result of"8 5 or "directly attributable"86 to
a criminal offense. While some concept of remoteness is necessary if a
distinction between criminal and accidental injuries is to be preserved,
one commentator has urged that compensation plans formulate their
own standards rather than apply the tests appropriate for the criminal
law.
8 7
B. Determining Which Victims Should Be Eligible
None of the justifications, for shifting losses from the victim of crime
extend to the person who is responsible for his own injuries,88 and all
of the plans contain provisions intended to prevent such victims from
receiving compensation.89 These provisions do not, however, supply
83 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, § 17(6); S. 2155, § 301(f); H.R. 11818, § 301(f); CMND. 2823, at 5.
84 But see Case No. 119, Criminal Injuries Board Awards-April 1965, 1965 CraM. L.
REv. (Eng.) 452 (compensation denied to child hit by rock on ground that assailant below
age of criminal responsibility). Other plans avoid that result by providing that the
offender's lack of capacity to form criminal intent should be disregarded. N.Z. Pub. Act
134, § 17(2); S. 2155, § 301(c); H.R. 11818, § 301(c). See Rothstein, supra note 64, at 39-47.
85 H.R. 11818, § 301(e)(2); S. 2155, § 301(e)(2). Cf. N.Z. Pub. Act 134 which, as originally
drafted, made compensaiion payable for injuries "resulting" from a crime; that language
was altered to make compensation payable for injury or death "by" a crime in order to
limit more dearly the scheme to immediate victims upon whom crimes were perpetrated
and to avoid difficulties of causation, although there is doubt as to whether that effect
has been achieved. Cameron, supra note 59, at 371-72.
86 CMND. 2323, at 5. Compare Case No. B.6, Criminal Injuries Compensation Awards-
May 1965, 1965 CiM. L. Rtv. (Eng.) 502, 506 (compensation denied a man who, knocked
down by another, fell and hit his head against a radiator), with Case No. AA8, Criminal
Injuries Compensation Awards-June 1965, 1965 CRiam. L. R1v. (Eng.) 567, 569 (compen-
sation awarded to a woman injured when a gate, removed from its hinges by boys, fell
on her).
87 Rothstein, supra note 64, at 40-44.
88 The victim to whom responsibility attaches cannot be said to have relied on the
state for protection, and it is arguable that the state should not assist him in collecting
restitution from the offender. The culpable victim might be excluded from a plan based
on a 'social welfare rationale on the ground that he is not a proper object of social
sympathy and that one who by wronging or provoking another creates a risk of injury
to himself has no claim for indemnity from other members of the community who do
not engage in such conduct. See CMND. 1406, at 11-12; notes 101-02 infra and accompanying
text.
89 Only the California plan omits a provision disqualifying the culpable victim.
CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 11211. For provisions of the other plans, see notes 93,
104-05 infra and accompanying text.
1966] Compensation for Crime Victims
criteria to be applied in appraising the conduct of victims, perhaps
because there is considerable uncertainty as to what those criteria
should be.
Although much support for compensation has been generated by the
image of the victim as a hapless citizen asaulted by a stranger on a dark
street, a substantial majority of crimes of violence arise from close
personal relationships" and are, in the view of one critic of compen-
sation, often the product of the personality of the victim as well as of
the offender.9' That circumstance should not be equated with fault
on the victim's part, and the implication that crimes motivated by
personal antagonism are for that reason outside the sphere of public
responsibility is of doubtful validity.9 2 Nonetheless, it might be argued
that the greater potential of victim involvement in personal crimes and
the difficulties involved in establishing its presence are sufficient to
warrant the exclusion of such victims on a categorical basis. Thus, some
compensation plans have excluded victims who are relatives of the
offender's family or members of his household from receiving awards.93
Although this exclusion has been attributed to the difficulties of deter-
mining the facts surrounding such incidents and to a desire to prevent
90 While crimes against property are generally directed at the possessions of strangers,
crimes of violence are typically provoked by personal relationships. According to the
FBI, killings within the family constituted 31% of murders in 1964. Murders "outside
the family unit, usually altercations between acquaintances" amounted to 49% of the
total; 22% of these arose from lovers' quarrels or romantic entanglements and 17%
from drinking situations. Only 15% of the murders in 1964 fell into the felony-murder
category while the genesis of the remaining 5% is unknown. FBI, UNIFORM CmRIM REPORTS
-1964, at 7. About two-thirds of aggravated assaults were committed between members
of families or acquaintances. Id. at 8.
91 Weihofen, asserting the significance of psychological interaction between victim and
offender, states that the victim frequently plays the role of an "activating sufferer."
Weihofen, supra note 80, at 217.
92 The question whether the existence of personal relationships apart from fault is
a proper basis for denying compensation arises most significantly in connection with
crimes committed between members of a family. The exclusion of family crimes is perhaps
consonant with the duty to protect argument in light of the putative impossibility of a
state's preventing all such crimes, and probably is not inconsistent with the restitution
theory since tort liability does not arise in many such situations. A distinction between
family and other personal relationships seems less appropriate, however, in a plan based
on social welfare principles, although there may be some reluctance to intervene in family
life by making judgments as to the conduct of its members.
03 The federal proposals exclude "relatives" of the offender or members of his household
from compensation, with relatives being broadly defined to include not only spouses and
children but also grandparents, aunts and uncles, and others. S. 2155, § 102(5); H.R. 11818,
§ 102(5). That broad formulation was taken from the New Zealand law, which does not
bar such victims from compensation but only from pain and suffering damages. N.Z.
Pub. Act 134, § 18. The British plan excludes victims who are members of the offender's
household living with him at the time of the crime. CMND. 2323, at 6.
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the offender from benefiting from the victim's award,94 commentators
have suggested that these problems, while significant, be surmounted
by special provisions for payment and requirements of proof for family
crimes rather than by a blanket exclusion.9 5
The controversy over the extent to which victims of crime are re-
sponsible for their injuries has not been resolved,96 but the perception
that culpability attaches to at least some victims is a significant one.
As Professor Weihofen has observed, the law makes little allowance for
the "tormenting conduct" of victims; 97 personal motives excuse neither
crime nor tort,98 and application of the rules of provocation and self
defense are sufficiently narrow as to often result in the imposition of
liability on the offender despite the victim's aggravating or aggressive
behavior.9 9 Weihofen's conclusion that compensation requires a new
definition of fault by which to measure the conduct of victims seems
correct, inasmuch as the criminal law is concerned with the conduct
of the victim only as it affects the culpability of the offender, and the
tort law's allocation of loss between victim and offender has no neces-
sary bearing on the allocation between victim and community. 0 0 The
94 CMND. 1406, at 12-13. Yarborough, S. 2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress-The Crimi-
nal Injuries Compensation Act, 50 MINN. L. Rav. 255 (1965).
95 See JUsTIcE RFPORT 9-10; Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal
Injury, 50 MINN. L. REV. 271, 276-77 (1965).
96 Weihofen and Mueller have put considerable emphasis on the problem of victim
"involvement." Weihofen, supra note 80; Mueller, Comment on the Proposal, Compen-
sation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 218, 231-32 (1959);
Mueller, Compensation for Victims of Crime: Thought Before Action, 50 MINN. L. Rv.
213, 214-15 (1965). Frequently reliance is placed upon Wolfgang's study of 588 criminal
homicides in Philadelphia which determined that 26% of the killings were "victim
precipitated" in that the victim was the first to "show and use a deadly weapon, to strike
a blow in an altercation . . . the first to commence the interplay or resort to physical
violence." Wolfgang, Victim Precipitated Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 1, 3
(1957). Wolgang further concluded that "in many cases the victim has many of the major
characteristics of an offender.., it is probably only chance which results in one becoming
a victim and the other becoming an offender." Id. at 11.
Mueller considers the evidence sufficient to show that there may be "few non-culpable"
victims of crime. Mueller, supra, 8 J. Pun. L. at 231. Childres, however, regards the evidence
as demonstrating only that a minority of victims are responsible for their injuries. Childres,
supra note 77, 39 N.Y.U.L. Ray. at 468-69. See also Childres, supra note 95, 50 MINN. L.
Rv. at 272-74.
97 Weihofen, supra note 80, at 212.
98 Cf. PROSSER, TORTs §§ 19, 111 (3d ed. 1964).
99 As, for example, where the victim strikes the first blow but the offender retaliates
with unreasonable force. Ibid.
100 When the offender is acquitted on grounds of self defense the criminal law provides
a de minimis definition of victim involvement because the victim's injuries are not attrib-
utable to a criminal offense. In situations where the victim's conduct mitigates rather
than excuses the offender from criminal responsibility, as where a murder charge is
reduced to manslaughter, however, the law furnishes little guide to the victim's status.
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British Working Party, observing that a person who sustains injury
by reason of his character or course of conduct has assumed the risk
of criminal injury and is not a proper object of social sympathy,101
concluded that compensation should be paid only for "unprovoked
assaults upon innocent persons."'01 2 It was nonetheless considered im-
practicable to appraise provocation and innocence by reference to ex-
plicit standards; 103 the administrative board was instead authorized in
broad terms to inquire into the conduct of victims and to take degrees
of fault into account when making awards. 104 The New Zealand and
federal plans follow a similar approach, although the federal proposals
make no allowance for partial responsibility. 105
Experience under the British plan suggests that despite their broad
power to do so, administrators of the scheme infrequently disqualify
victims for fault. Findings of fault are made only in the context of
conduct at the time of the incident, 106 and even then awards are gener-
ally reduced rather than denied altogether.107 The number of cases
in which the victim's conduct has affected his award appears small,108
although this may reflect a decision on the part of culpable victims not
to seek compensation as well as the liberal policy of the Board.
Although tort law offers defenses which the offender can raise against the victim's claim,
application of these rules may not produce a markedly different result from those of the
criminal law, particularly as these rules have in some instances been subordinated to the
policy of the criminal law. See Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches
of the Peace, 24 COLum. L. REv. 819 (1924).
101 "[Crimes of violence] are by no means always committed upon honest persons, and
where a particular crime arises directly from the undesirable activities of the victim, his
mode of life, and the company he keeps, it could scarcely be argued that the State had
any moral obligation to compensate him." CNIND. 1406, at 11.
102 Ibid.
103 Id. at 11-12.
104 CMND. 2323, at 6.
105 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, § 19(7)(a); S. 2155 § 301(d); H.R. 11818 § 301(d).
106 In one case the Board resorted to a technicality rather than deny compensation on
the basis of past conduct. Case No. H.13, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Report,
Dec. 31, 1965, at 7. In that case, compensation was denied to a man shot by an escaped
convict with whose wife he had been living. The victim refused to discuss the incident with
the police, although his assailant, whose identity was not in doubt, was later apprehended
and prosecuted on other charges. The award was denied on the ground that the scheme's
requirement that the crime have been reported to the police or have been the subject of
criminal prosecution had not been met.
107 A typical decision when the victim willingly engages in a fight is to assess his
responsibility at 50% and to reduce his award accordingly. See (Abstract) Case No. A.3,
Criminal Injuries Compensation Awards-May 1965, 1965 CaIM. L. REv. (Eng.) 502, 505.
108 For example, of 74 cases abstracted in the Criminal Law Review in one month,
there are only three assessments of partial responsibility and no instances of an award
denied outright for reasons of fault. See Criminal Injuries Compensation Awards-May
1965, 1965 CRaM. L. REv. (Eng.) 502-08.
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The slight significance accorded to fault in the British scheme has
substantial practical advantages; it is desirable to confine the investi-
gation before awards are made to events surrounding the commission
of a crime, as determinations of the circumstances which preceded it
would be difficult to make and limits on the scope of inquiry hard to
impose. 10 9 The British Board's reluctance to apply a standard embrac-
ing prior conduct and its allowance for partial responsibility is further
suggestive of tension between the objective of confining compensation
to "genuine and deserving""u 0 victims and the social welfare character
of the scheme. Eligibility for government benefits is not ordinarily con-
tingent on judgments of character, past associations, and the like; com-
pensation, insofar as it introduces a broad notion of blameworthiness,
represents an unusual departure from other social welfare programs
which function on the basis of need regardless of fault.
C. The Amount of Damages
Provisions for the payment of damages vary considerably among the
different compensation plans. There is general agreement that the
amounts of awards in a tax supported program should be less than jury
verdicts in personal injury lawsuits. On the basic question of whether
compensation should be paid on a common law pattern or should in-
stead resemble workmen's compensation or social welfare programs
there is less disagreement. One federal proposal allows recovery of
damages on the common law pattern for the victim's medical and other
expenses, past and future loss of earnings, and pain and suffering,
subject to a $25,000 ceiling on the total award to any one claimant."'
The British and New Zealand plans also adopt the common law ele-
ments of damage;" 2 the British plan, however, limits awards for loss
of earnings to an amount equal to twice the average weekly industrial
wage, 11 and the New Zealand plan imposes ceilings on recovery for
109 As an illustration of the difficulties of including prior conduct within the investi-
gation, consider that A's claim based on an assault by jealous husband B would require
a determination not only as to the circumstances of the assault but also as to whether A
had in fact been having an affair with B's wife. Similarly, one might imagine a claim
by the widow of a slain gangster; since it is unlikely that evidence of her husband's
criminal activities would be forthcoming, denial of her claim would have to be predicated
on her husband's reputation as a gangster.
110 CMND. 1406, at 11.
"'l S. 2155, §§ 303, 504(b) (the Yarborough bill). The Green bill also imposes a $25,000
ceiling on awards, but does not allow recovery for pain and suffering damages. H.R.
11818, §§ 303, 304(b).
112 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, § 19(3); CNxND. 2323, at 6. None of the plans allow the victim
to recover punitive damages.
113 CMND. 2323, at 6. In Britain the flat rate, subsistence level benefits of social welfare
programs were thought inadequate, JusTicE R-PoRT 16-17; CMND. 1406, at 14-16, but some
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loss of earnings and for pecuniary loss to dependents which approxi-
mate benefits under that country's social security and worker's com-
pensation programs.114 These variations in the scale of awards are
characteristic of the hybrid nature of the plans; while the social welfare
rationale on which they are based would seem to justify considerable
departure from common law principles, there has been here as else-
where an effort to compromise with those principles rather than
abandon them altogether.
Under most plans other public payments received by the victim as a
result of his injuries are deducted from his award.115 These provisions
seem justifiable as simple economy measures in the absence of any
argument for requiring the state to make double payment for the same
injuries. Consideration might also be given to the subtraction of pri-
vate insurance payments which reduce the victim's need for assistance,
on the reasoning that the collateral benefits rule which serves to prevent
wrongdoers from escaping full damages by virtue of the prudence of
those whom they injure,116 has no application to a compensation plan;
as the public is not a wrongdoer, there is no reason for departing from
the general principle that damages should be compensatory for losses
actually incurred. Compensation plans have, however, resisted the de-
duction of private insurance payments, 117 perhaps less from a fear that
such deductions would discourage the purchase of private insurance" 8
than from a conviction that social insurance available to rich and poor
alike is preferable to welfare conceived as charity to the needy.119 Rec-
ognition that compensation may not absorb all the victim's losses, and
that private insurance may be similarly limited, suggests that in many
cases private insurance coupled with compensation may not be a double
payment but may instead represent a partial contribution from two
sources; in such situations, it seems preferable to regard compensation,
degree of standardization was thought necessary: "[A] State scheme which resulted in two
persons, because they followed different employments, being paid different amounts in
respect of identical injuries ... might be regarded as unfair." CMND. 1406, at 15.
114 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, §§ 19(3)(a), (b); see Cameron, supra note 59, at 374. Cameron
considers that scale too low, but states that it was thought politically unfeasible to pay
victims of crime at a higher rate than victims of industrial injuries. Id. at 873-74.
115 N.Z. Pub. Act 134, §§ 19(7)(b), (c), (d); S. 2155, § 305(b); H.R. 11818, § 305(b); CMND.
2323, at 7.
116 Cf. McCo aicK, DAMAGES § 90, at 824 (1985).
117 Senator Yarborough indicates, however, that under his bill the commission would
have discretionary authority to make such deductions. Yarborough, supra note 94, at 263.
118 See Childres, supra note 77, 89 N.Y.U.L. Rlv., at 444. It seems unlikely, however, that
the deduction would impair the purchase of private insurance, as most people probably re-
gard the risk of criminal injury as minimal and do not take it into account when deciding
whether or not to purchase medical or life insurance.
119 Cf. JUSTICE REPORT 19; CNIND. 1406, at 19.
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like social security, as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for,
private insurance.
Some writers have suggested that compensation should not include
payments for pain and suffering,120 which are commonly omitted from
workmen's compensation and public programs, on the grounds that
such damages are unduly speculative and that it is appropriate for a
government plan which cannot shift the victim's entire loss to give
priority to economic losses.121 In another view, pain and suffering
are considered important elements of damage properly included in
compensation as opposed to other public programs122 on the theory that
the public wishes to recognize the particularly unpleasant nature of
criminal injury, as well as its financial consequences. 123 In New Zealand
nominal damages for pain and suffering 24 were retained primarily as a
concession to victims of sexual offenses who might have minimal actual
damages on which to found a claim. 125 That reasoning, however, con-
fuses payments for pain with payments for psychic injury which might
be compensated as such.126 Compensation for the dignitary aspects of
criminal injury may be greater in Britain and New Zealand, where free
medical care and other public benefits absorb some portion of the
victim's financial losses, than in the United States, where awards for
medical and other expenses would be larger, and compensation without
pain and suffering would not be an empty gesture to most victims. 127
120 See, e.g., Childres, supra note 95, 50 MINN. L. REv. at 278.
121 Ibid. The argument against pain and suffering damages is based in part on the
objections to such awards in common law actions. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal In-
jury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 222-35 (1953). For parallel
proposals to eliminate such damages in many automobile compensation plans, see KETON
& O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEcriON FOR THE TRAFVic VienIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 358-62 (1965).
122 Cf. BLUM & KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO
COMPENSATION PLANS 34-36 (1965), suggesting that pain and suffering are real elements of
personal injury and should not be easily dismissed. See also Starrs, A Modest Proposal
To Insure Justice for Victims of Crime, 50 MINN. L. REv. 285, 306-08 (1965).
123 See the suggestion that damages in a compensation plan might be paid according
to the seriousness of the crime as well as the injury to the victim in Wolfgang, supra
note 96, at 236-40. The British Working Party rejected the notion that compensation
should be paid for the unpleasantness of the victim's experience, CraND. 1406, at 15, and
the plans have generally approached compensation as a contribution toward the conse-
quences of injury, of which pain and suffering is one aspect.
124 Pain and suffering damages are limited under the New Zealand plan to N.Z. £500
($1,400). N.Z. Pub. Act 134, § 19(3)(d).
125 Cameron, Compensation for Crimes of Violence: The New Zealand Experiment,
12 J. PUB. L. 367, 373 (1963).
126 The federal proposals define "personal injury" to include "mental or nervous shock."
S. 2155, § 102(4); H.R. 11818, § 102(4). Allowance is thus made for psychic damage as a
medical problem, permitting payment of compensation for psychiatric treatment.
127 Rather than eliminate pain and suffering damages altogether as the Green bill does,
or include them on the same basis as pecuniary loss as does the Yarborough bill, a
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Compensation comparable in scale to other social welfare programs
and without pain and suffering damages would seriously delimit the
common law principle that damages should be fully compensatory and
tailored to the particular case.128 Hence treatment of compensation as
an adjunct of workmen's compensation, as a proposal introduced in
Maryland suggests, 29 may be sensible. Injured victims and the depen-
dents of victims killed would be reimbursed for their out of pocket
expenses, while payments for loss of earnings and pecuniary loss to
dependents would be measured as a percentage of actual earnings lost
added to a fixed or base sum for disability. 30 Such scheduled damages
do not appear incompatible with the adjustment of awards in accor-
dance with degrees of fault on the part of the victim, as the British
feared; 131 moreover, the system may have administrative advantages,
tending to reduce delay and promote uniformity in the making of
awards, which would be significant in a national plan or one operated
by a large state where the volume of claims would be large.132
separate ceiling on pain and suffering damages might be imposed. Cf. N.Z. Pub. Act 134,
§ 19(3)(d). Such a compromise reduces the difficulty posed by large claims based primarily
on nonpecuniary loss; under the Yarborough bill, victims with severe physical injuries for
which damages approached the $25,000 ceiling would be awarded little or no compensa-
tion for their pain, while victims with minor physical injuries could seek large pain and
suffering awards. See Letter From Norval Morris, Professor of Law and Criminology of
The University of Chicago Law School to Senator Ralph W. Yarborough, Aug. 21, 1965,
copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review office.
128 BLuM & KALvEN, op. cit. supra note 122, at 33.
129 Maryland S. Bill No. 151 (1966). The original Fry proposal envisaged a plan com-
parable to industrial accident benefits. Fry, Justice for Victims, The Observer (London),
July 7, 1957, p. 8, col. 2, reprinted in Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence:
A Round Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 191, 192-93 (1959). The workmen's compensation analogy
influenced the scale of awards in New Zealand. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
130 Maryland S. Bill No. 151, § 1(4)(a)(3)(i) (1966). One difficulty of the workmen's com-
pensation approach is that victims of crime, unlike injured workers, may be unemployed
persons, housewives, children, and others whose disability does not affect earnings. See
CMND. 1406, at 15. The Maryland bill answers this problem by allowing such victims to
receive the base sum payments for total disability allowed under workmen's compensation
apart from the further amount allowed for loss of earnings; the commission also has dis-
cretion to take the victim's earning power and other sources of income into account.
131 Cf. Maryland S. Bill No. 151, § l(4)(a)(1) (1966), giving the commission discretion to
diminish awards by reason of the victim's conduct. The British had thought that allowance
for fault would be difficult to make with scheduled awards. JusnTcE REPoRT 12; CMND.
1406, at 27. In practice, however, the British Board assesses the victim's fault as a per-
centage figure and reduces his award accordingly. See note 107 supra. This procedure
could be applied to scheduled awards as well; workmen's compensation statutes in three
states permit reduction of awards on a percentage basis for accidents caused ,by serious
fault or intoxication of the employee. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-4 (1963); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-1-14 (1953); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 102.58 (1957). California permits a reduction for
the employees "serious and wilful" negligence. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4551 (50% reduction
except in certain enumerated instances).
132 The New Zealand Tribunal has decided only 26 cases in the first two and a half
years of its existence. Report on the Operation of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act
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D. The Administration of Compensation
The dimensions of the compensation plans do not require complex
administrative machinery; either integration with an existing agency,
the approach adopted in California, 133 or creation of a small indepen-
dent agency as under the British, New Zealand, and federal proposals 34
seems a satisfactory solution. The small scale of the plans should not,
however, obscure the importance of a systematic procedure for making
awards. Compensation should be made with a minimum of delay and
expense to victims, for not only would much of the benefit of awards
for medical expenses and lost earnings be unrealized, particularly for
uninsured victims, if awards were not paid quickly, but also those most
in need are those least able to invest their resources in making a
claim.135 If some compromise with the adversary process seems necessary
to meet the needs of victims, 136 however, the countervailing social
interest in defeating invalid claims must also be recognized.
The federal proposals require that compensation claims be deter-
mined at an administrative hearing at which both victim and agency
may be represented by counsel and may introduce evidence and cross-
examine witnesses. 37 The requirement that a hearing be held in every
case imposes considerable burdens on claimants, particularly as most
victims would need the assistance of counsel which would probably
of 1963. In 1965, the British Criminal Injuries Board received 2043 applications. Criminal
Injuries Compensation Board, Report Dec. 31, 1965.
133 The California program is administered by the state Department of Social Welfare.
See CAL. WELTARE & INsT'Ns CODE § 11211. The Maryland plan would be carried out by
the state Workmen's Compensation Commission. Maryland S. Bill No. 151 (1966). The Cali-
fornia and New York Good Samaritan laws provide for an application to an existing public
claims agency. See note 41 supra.
134 The British Board has five members. CMND. 2323, at 4. The New Zealand Tribunal
and the federal commissions proposed would have three. N.Z. Pub. Act 134, § 4; S. 2155,
§ 201(a); H.R. 11818, § 201(a).
135 The JusTicE REPORT urged that consideration be given to making compensation for
immediate expenses available when needed. JusTicE REPORT 15-16. None of the plans,
however, has made such provision.
136 The law has often required prospective plaintiffs to undergo delay and expense
in bringing an action; as Blum and Kalven point out, "the deficiency of the common
law as a first aid mechanism . . . is intrinsic to its liability for fault rationale." BLUm &
KALVEN, op. cit. supra note 122, at 71. But where the issues to be determined bear not
on personal liability but on eligibility for a government program, and where the benefits
bear little relation to common law damages, it seems appropriate that a program meet
emergencyneeds and not deter claimants with the expense of making a claim, provided
that the social interest in defeating unmerited claims can be satisfied.
137 S. 2155, § 205; H.R. 11818, § 205. Relevant evidence may be admitted regardless of
its admissibility in a court of law. S. 2155, § 205(h); H.R. 11818, § 205(h). Proceedings
are to be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. S. 2155, § 205(j); H.R. 11818,
§ 205(j).
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become available 38 only if claims were routinized as under workmen's
compensation.' 39 A better procedure may be that adopted by the British
and New Zealand plans, where the victim who submits an application
receives an initial decision by one member of the agency after staff in-
vestigation of his claim;140 if unsatisfied, he may seek a hearing at
which he is required to make his case. The hearing is apparently re-
garded as a form of appeal within the agency, most claims being decided
on the basis of the initial staff investigation. 141 The two-level procedure
offers adequate safeguards to the agency as well as to the victim, 14 2 and
should also be less wasteful of time and money than requiring hearings
in all cases. 143
138 The federal proposals allow for the payment of legal fees out of but not in addition
to awards made in an amount not exceeding 15% of awards over $1,000. This provision,
taken from the Federal Tort Claims Act, may be adequate when large awards are made,
but Senator Yarborough concedes that victims seeking smaller sums may have difficulty
in attracting legal assistance. Yarborough, supra note 94, at 260-61; see Attorneys' Fees
Before Government Bureaus, 25 ALA. LAw. 78 (1964).
139 In New York, the average attorney's fee in workmen compensation cases in one year
was 2% of awards over $10,000. Gelhorn & Lauer, Administration of the New York Work-
men's Compensation Law II, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 204, 220 (1962). The willingness of lawyers
to appear in workmen's compensation cases despite limited fees is attributable partly to
the existence of a highly specialized workmen's compensation bar, whose members handle
large numbers of claims; lawyers have little to do in routine cases and their function is
often purely formal. Id. at 217-22. Unless the volume of criminal compensation claims were
sufficiently great to engender a specialized bar, and unless compensation proceedings were
routinized to a comparable degree, it is doubtful that the needed legal assistance would
be forthcoming.
140 CMND. 2323, at 7. The language of the New Zealand law is identical with that of
the federal proposals, but the Tribunal follows the British procedure of deciding claims
on the basis of staff investigation. Report on the Operation of the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act of 1963.
141 An early report on the British scheme stressed the infrequency with which claimants
request a hearing. Camt. 2782, at 5-6. Later figures show 802 awards made by a single
member and 32 awards made after a hearing. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,
Report, Dec. 31, 1965.
142 The British Board would prefer, however, to have the power to request a hearing
rather than leave the initiative wholly with the claimant. A single member when in doubt
as to an award may sometimes deny the claim, and it has been suggested that the opinion
of the full Board at a hearing might result in more decisions favorable to claimants. See
CNIrNM. 2782, at 6-7.
143 The efficiency of settlement has been recognized under most workmen's compensation
laws, which usually permit employde and insurer to settle uncontested claims without a
hearing subject to commission approval. The vast bulk of claims are so settled. DODD,
ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 117-19 (1936). In New York a hearing is
required; at one point the requirement was dropped, but it was reinstated when it ap-
peared that employees were receiving fewer benefits than they were entitled to. At present,
the automatic hearing is a formality at which claimants are not usually present; the
examiner merely rubber-stamps staff approval of the settlement. Many feel that the
hearing is no longer needed to protect the employee. Gelhorn & Lauer, Administration
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Staff investigation would probably also be more efficient than a
hearing procedure in gathering the information necessary to determine
claims. Because police reports4 4 and the conclusions of police officers
will often be the most reliable information as to the circumstances of
an incident, requesting submission of such reports to the agency 45
seems more desirable than requiring the victim to produce such in-
formation. Similarly, provision for a medical examiner might relieve
the victim of the expense of supplying medical testimony and also pro-
cure standardized and impartial evaluations for the agency. In routine
cases, the information needed to make awards would be available to
administrators from police and medical reports and the victim's account
of the event; a hearing seems appropriate only when facts are disputed.
Although some commentators have feared that paying victims soon
after their injuries are sustained would threaten the administration of
criminal justice by weakening the victim's interest in cooperating in
criminal prosecutions, 46 a more likely danger is that the victim would
have an overly strong interest in the conviction of the offender as a
means of establishing his claim. The federal plans contribute somewhat
to that incentive by providing that conviction of the offender will be
conclusive evidence that a compensable crime has been committed; 147
of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law (pts. 1, 3), 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 3, 25-28, 564,
607-15 (1962).
This experience suggests that the hearing may be needed to safeguard the claimant
when private insurers or others have an adverse interest in opposing his claim, but might
be unnecessary in a compensation plan administered by an agency which not only repre-
sents an adverse interest, but also serves as disinterested arbiter. A hearing which is a
routine formality is not, in any case, a safeguard to either public or claimant.
144 The British plan requires that the victim have reported the crime to the police
or that criminal proceedings have been initiated. CMND. 2323, at 5. The other plans do
not contain such a requirement, which would seem desirable both to encourage citizen
cooperation with the police and to discourage collusive claims. See JusTicE REPORT 23-24.
145 It has been suggested that the task of investigating claims be delegated to police
authorities who would certify to the agency their conclusions as to whether a crime had
been committed. JUsTIcE REPORT 15-16; Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted
Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 444, 464-65 (1964). That procedure would impose new
burdens on the police, however. Similarly, a further consideration militating against an
automatic hearing requirement is that it would probably require police officers to spend
much time testifying at hearings.
146 The only apparent rationale for this argument is that, once compensated, the victim
would lose interest in criminal prosecution because he would be indifferent to whether
or not the offender were convicted; his appetite for revenge would no longer demand
gratification at the criminal trial. See, e.g., Inbau, Comment on the Proposal, Compensa-
tion for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 201, 202-03 (1959);
Mueller, Comment on the Proposal, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence:
A Round Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 218, 219-31 (1959).
147 S. 2155, § 205(i); H.R. 11818, § 205(i), following a comparable provision in the New
Zealand law. The advantage to the claimant seems spurious, however, since the provision
does not operate until conviction of the offender is final, generally many months in
criminal proceedings.
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although it is unlikely that many victims would choose to postpone
their claims until a conviction became final. More questionably, the
federal plans provide for suspension of compensation proceedings at the
request of the Attorney General when criminal prosecution is immi-
nent; 48 this provision does little to safeguard the interests of defen-
dants, as an uncompensated victim is no less prejudiced than one who
has already received an award and may indeed be more so if the offen-
der's conviction will establish his eligibility for compensation. If fre-
quently invoked, the suspension would cause considerable delay in the
awarding of compensation and might tend to make compensation con-
tingent on the outcome of criminal trials.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of recent compensation plans suggests that, once the decision
to undertake such a program has been made, determination of its scope
will be governed largely by considerations of economic and adminis-
trative feasibility. Uniformly contemplating modest benefits to a small
class of persons, the plans are not ambitious in scale by comparison
with other public programs and, with the possible exception of the
undeserving victim, present no serious difficulties of execution. The
significant question is thus the original one of whether such a program
should be undertaken at all. Most people find the victim of crime an
appealing object of concern, and because the plans are small in scale
and do not, like medicare or other major reforms, threaten existing
interests, they have evoked little opposition. The considerations against
which the needs of victims of crime must be balanced have been largely
obscured from view, and it might be contended that special legislation
on behalf of the victim, while worthwhile, is of less pressing impor-
tance than other social problems which should be accorded priority.
Such experience as exists today indicates, however, that legislators are
disposed to decide the question of priorities in favor of the victim, and
that their initial response will, when a plan has been in effect for even
a short time, develop into the conviction that it would be unjust not
to provide such assistance. 49
148 S. 2155, § 301(f); H.R. 11818, § 301(f).
149 "[M]any of the applications submitted relate to relatively minor injuries and the
compensation paid is correspondingly small. But no one who is called to deal with those
cases in which a blameless victim has been seriously disabled . . . can fail to feel deeply
what a worthwhile part is played in the full administration of justice by the power to
award compensation." CMND. 2782, at 7.
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